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Masked Appetitive and Aversive but Not Neutral Stimuli
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Abstract
Interactions between cognition and emotion are important for survival, often occurring in the absence of awareness. These
interactions have been proposed to involve competition between cognition and emotion for attentional resources.
Emotional stimuli have been reported to impair performance on cognitive tasks of low, but not high, load if stimuli are
consciously perceived. This study explored whether this load-dependent interference effect occurred in response to
subliminal emotional stimuli. Masked emotional (appetitive and aversive), but not neutral, stimuli interfered with
performance accuracy but not response time on a cognitive task (n-back) at low (1-back), but not high (2-back) load. These
results show that a load-dependent interference effect applies to masked emotional stimuli and that the effect generalises
across stimulus categories with high motivational value. This supports models of selective attention that propose that
cognition and emotion compete for attentional resources. More specifically, interference from masked emotional stimuli at
low load suggests that attention is biased towards salient stimuli, while dissipation of interference under high load involves
top-down regulation of attention. Our data also indicate that top-down goal-directed regulation of attention occurs in the
absence of awareness and does not require metacognitive monitoring or evaluation of bias over behaviour, i.e., some
degree of self-regulation occurs at a non-conscious level.
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Introduction
Our world is replete with emotionally laden stimuli, much of
which we have learned to ignore. However, unattended stimuli
may still influence our thinking and behaviour, e.g., ‘gut feelings’
are used to make decisions, often to our advantage [1]. Moreover,
non-conscious perception of subliminally presented stimuli can
affect behaviour [2]. Rapid responses to salient environmental
cues, especially those with high motivational value (e.g., appetitive
or aversive stimuli) offers an important evolutionary survival
advantage [3] but, on the other hand, constant reorientation to
salient environmental cues may be detrimental to the maintenance
of goal-directed behaviour. It is likely therefore that processes exist
that regulate interactions between cognition and emotion [4].
Accordingly, several groups have proposed that emotion and
cognition compete for limited attentional resources [5–9]. Salient
stimuli with high motivational value are likely to capture more
attentional resources than those that are less motivationally
significant [9] and in a similar way, attentional resources are
taxed by increasing task demands (e.g., task difficulty). Thus, in
different scenarios, there is a need for either cognition or emotion
to dominate. Evidence for such interactions has been provided by
demonstrations of interference (impaired performance) resulting
from the presentation of distracting emotional stimuli during
cognitive tasks, and in a similar way, cognitive load has been
shown to moderate interference caused by supraliminal (con-
sciously perceived) emotional stimuli [3] and to down-regulate
activity in emotion processing centres (e.g., [10]). This suggests
that stimulus salience and task difficulty influence the level of
attentional resources captured during goal attainment. It is
unclear, however, whether this effect of load on emotional
processing is reliant on metacognition, i.e., the ability to reflect
on or regulate cognitive processes, or whether it occurs in the
absence of conscious awareness. This study addresses this question
by investigating the effect of masked emotional (appetitive and
aversive) and neutral stimuli on a working memory task (n-back) of
varying difficulty (1-back and 2-back).
Due to the limited capacity of attentional resources, individuals
must attend to some stimuli at the expense of others [4]. Models of
selective attention and emotional interference [5–9] propose that
levels of attention are determined by the balance between ‘bottom-
up’ sensory stimulus-driven influences such as salience (e.g.,
motivational value) and ‘top-down’ goal-directed influences (e.g.,
task demands). Thus, behaviours may be can be seen as lying on a
continuum between reflexive and voluntary, and depends on the
relative influence of these two factors [5]. For example, a biased
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competition model [8] proposes that attentional resources are
biased towards salient stimuli, but are also driven by top-down
regulation or feedback. In addition, individual differences in state,
trait or personal relevance of the goal or distracter stimuli are
thought to interact with stimulus salience and task demands to
contribute to the biasing of attentional allocation (for rev., see
[9,11]). Support for such models is provided by demonstrations of
interference, e.g., in terms of slowed response time or greater
errors on trials accompanied by additional emotional (vs. neutral)
information during affective variations of executive tasks (e.g., [12–
15]). In an affective variation of the Stroop task, individuals are
slower to name the colour of words with an emotional meaning
(e.g., [16]). Similarly, response times on the n-back task are slower
when targets are accompanied by emotional versus neutral words
[17,18]. Greater interference from positively and negatively
valenced emotional stimuli compared to neutral stimuli has been
seen in non-clinical populations [15,16], while in anxious or
depressed groups, negative stimuli elicit the greatest interference
[19]. These data support the biased or preferential allocation of
attention towards salient emotional compared to neutral stimuli.
In contrast to the frequently reported interference effect, a
facilitation effect has also been reported (e.g., [20,21]): this may be
partly determined by the relevance or congruency between
emotional stimuli and the cognitive task. Thus, if emotional
information is task-relevant or aligned with the task’s emotional
context, performance is likely to improve as resources needed to
process the emotional information will also be devoted to the task
(e.g., [20]), but if it is task-irrelevant or incongruent with the task
stimuli, resources allocated to its processing will be unavailable to
the task and interference will result [9]. This suggests that when
there is competition for limited attentional resources, emotional
information will be preferentially processed over non-emotional
information [4]. Thus, the influence of emotional stimuli on
cognitive performance as a consequence of attentional allocation is
at least partly dependent on task relevance.
Additionally, goal-directed influences may impact the level of
attentional resources captured by task relevant and irrelevant
stimuli. It has been proposed that increasing the difficulty of goal
attainment is associated with greater motivational arousal, as
reflected in greater subjective and physiological levels of arousal
(e.g., [22]). Thus, increasing motivational incentive by enhancing
task difficulty may bias attentional resources towards the task-
relevant stimuli. Moreover, more difficult tasks require greater
concentration, thereby occupying greater attentional resources. If
competition for attentional resources between cognitive and
emotional processing exists, then interference by irrelevant
emotional stimuli will be sensitive to cognitive load, i.e., increasing
cognitive load would leave less attentional resources available for
processing task-irrelevant emotional stimuli. As a consequence,
interference should be reduced as task demands increase. There is
support for this, i.e., that emotional interference effects are affected
by cognitive load due to competition for attentional resources For
example, research has shown that task-irrelevant emotional
expressions interfere with performance on gender naming tasks
during low but not high working memory load [3,23]. These
findings are supported by neuroimaging data showing decreased
activity in emotion processing centres under conditions of
increased load [10,14,24–26], although note that in the study by
Erk et al. [25], emotional distracters had no behavioural effect on
task performance. Such load-related downregulation has even
been observed in the absence of emotional distracters [26]. Thus,
biased processing of salient emotional stimuli appears to be
dependent on the availability of attentional resources. If such
competition does not exist, attentional resources should remain
biased towards processing of salient stimuli regardless of their
relevance to the task, and thus interference should be seen at all
levels of task difficulty. It has been proposed that load-dependent
elimination of interference may be specific to perceptual load, but
does not generalise to cognitive load [27]. If perceptual and top-
down cognitive processes do not compete for the same attentional
resources, increasing cognitive load would exhaust resources
available for cognitive processing, leaving less for actively
regulating selective attention and maintaining goal-directed
behaviour [28]. Greater load may therefore enhance interference
caused by emotional stimuli [29,30]. Accordingly, greater inter-
ference has been associated with increased load (e.g., [29]). For
example, Lavie and de Fockert [30] reported that performance of
a visual search task was impaired under conditions of high working
memory load compared to no or low working memory load;
however, the distracter stimuli had goal-relevant features, even
though they did not provide task-relevant information.
Many studies on the effects of emotional stimuli on cognition
are ‘implicit’, i.e., stimuli are available for cognitive processing but
not fully attended to. These include presenting emotional stimuli
as background images (e.g., [19,31]) or flanking stimuli (e.g., [18])
in an emotional n-back paradigm, or including emotionally
expressive faces in a gender naming task [3,23]. However, as the
emotional aspect of these stimuli remains available for conscious
processing and evaluation, responses may be influenced by
metacognition, i.e., the ability to reflect on and regulate one’s
cognitive activity [32,33]. However, subliminally presented
emotional stimuli (e.g., using masking paradigms) have been
shown to affect behaviour (e.g., [34]) and activity in emotion
processing centres, including the amygdala [35]. Interestingly, the
effects of subliminal stimuli on behaviour are distinguishable from
those caused by supraliminal stimuli (for rev., see [2]). For
example, one study reported that priming (modulating behaviour
as a function of exposure to an emotional stimulus) with emotional
faces only affected subjects’ ratings of their impression of four
targets when the primes were presented subliminally, suggesting
that individuals can control their bias to supraliminal primes [36].
Neuroimaging data are in accord with these behavioural studies,
suggesting that processing of subliminal and supraliminal emo-
tional stimuli involve different neural substrates (e.g, [37,38]). For
example, Liddell et al. [39] observed a double dissociation in an
ERP study comparing perception of subliminal vs. supraliminal
fearful and neutral stimuli, with subliminal fear perception
associated with enhancement of early components thought to be
related to ‘‘orienting’’, and supraliminal fear being associated with
enhancement of later components involved in ‘‘event integration’’.
They proposed these findings reflect the time course of fear
perception: initial automatic, non-conscious processing, followed
by later controlled, evaluative conscious processing. From such
data, it has been suggested that supraliminal stimuli activate post-
attentive metacognitions to regulate or suppress pre-attentive
processing biases [40]. Lack of awareness of stimuli may therefore
impede metacognitive regulation [41]. It is therefore of interest to
examine how top-down goal-directed influences affect the
automatic bias towards salient stimuli during a cognitive task in
the absence of metacognitions.
To maintain efficient neural processing, goal-directed cognitions
and salient irrelevant stimuli often compete for attention outside of
conscious awareness. Given the data supporting the influence of
subliminal emotional stimuli on behaviour, it is likely that unaware
stimuli can capture attentional resources, but the extent to which
this occurs is unclear. It is also likely that competitive interference
exists outside of conscious awareness. If this is the case, subliminal
stimuli will interact with cognitive load in the same way as
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supraliminal stimuli, i.e., interference from irrelevant emotional
stimuli will occur under low, but not high load. On the other hand,
if top-down goal-directed cognitive regulation requires the
assistance of metacognitive processes, regulation of biases towards
salient stimuli will not occur, and interference will be expected at
both high and low load.
In the present study, we used masking to investigate the effect of
subliminal irrelevant emotional stimuli on performance of a
cognitive task (n-back) at low load (1-back) and high load (2-back).
We also explored the generalisability of interference effects by
using multiple categories of salient emotional stimuli with high
motivational value (appetitive and aversive images). As cognition-
emotion interactions occur outside of awareness, goal-directed
influences are predicted to regulate emotional processing even in
the absence of conscious awareness. Thus, it is hypothesised that
(a) greater interference will result from presentation of masked
emotional compared to neutral stimuli; (b) greater interference will
occur under conditions of low compared to high cognitive load; (c)
there will be no difference in interference elicited by the two types
of emotional stimuli (appetitive and aversive).
Methods
Ethics statement
The study was approved by the Institute of Psychiatry, KCL
ethics committee (297/02). The study adhered to the guidelines as
set out in the Declaration of Helsinki. All participants gave written
consent after the procedures were explained and were debriefed
after the experiment. Participants were reimbursed £10 for their
time.
Participants
31 healthy participants (18 female) were recruited by email
advertisement at King’s College London. Their mean age was
25.4 years (SD 8.7; range 18–55) and they had a mean of 15.4 (SD
2.3; range 10–20) years of formal education. Mean IQ, estimated
by the National Adult Reading Test (NART; [42]), was 114.0 (SD
8.9; range 91–127). All were native English speakers. Exclusion
criteria: axis I mental disorder, neurological disease, history of
head trauma with loss of consciousness and current use of
psychotropic medication. Participants were forewarned that they
may be presented with emotionally strong images but not told
these would be embedded in cognitive tasks.
Procedure
After screening using the Structured Clinical Interview for
Diagnosis (SCID), Researcher Version [43], participants per-
formed the computerised n-back task involving two levels of
difficulty (1-back, 2-back). A block design was employed, with each
block comprised of 20 trials. On each trial, a distracter stimulus
was presented briefly, followed by presentation of an n-back target
on a mosaic background. Thus, 20 distracter stimuli (of the same
distracter type) and 20 n-back targets were presented in each
block. All trials within a block were of the same level of difficulty
(1-back or 2-back) and distracters were of the same distracter type
(aversive, appetitive, or neutral). The task design is illustrated in
figure 1. Difficulty level and distracter type alternated with each
block in a fixed order, which was counterbalanced between
participants to control for order effects and differential transfer.
Each distracter stimulus was used 4 times throughout the task, with
distracters presented in a pseudorandomised order.
The influence of conscious processing of the distracters was
minimised by using a backward masking procedure [44].
Distracters (1268 cm) were presented on a screen for 23 ms,
immediately preceding each target. Pilot data using the same
apparatus and stimuli indicated that a stimulus onset asynchrony
(SOA) of 23 ms was ideal to reliably present stimuli on the screen
(all stimuli are visible in the absence of mask) and prevent
awareness of stimuli in most subjects. In both tasks, participants
were presented with a sequence of letters as targets (2.4 cm high,
in red) on a background of a high contrast mosaic (eight mosaics
used in a random order), which served as a mask for backward
masking of the stimuli. Each letter was presented for 1077 ms and
followed by a blank screen for 400 ms. The resulting rate of
presentation was one screen every 1.5 sec. The backward masking
procedure used in this study is illustrated in figure 2.
After both tasks, a forced choice test assessed the effectiveness of
the masking procedure [44]. Tasks were presented on a 150
computer screen at eye level at a distance of 50 cm. Responses
were made using a computer mouse.
Distracter stimuli
Colour images of appetitive foods (e.g. cake) and aversive
images (e.g. a bloody body) were used as positively and negatively
valenced stimuli, respectively. Appetitive, aversive and neutral
visual stimuli were selected in two steps. In the first step, a
collection of images for each category were preselected to provide
Figure 1. Paradigm design. This figure illustrates the block design
for the N-back task, in which the type of masked distracter stimuli
(NEUTRAL (N); FOOD (F); AVERSIVE (A)) and the level of difficulty (1-
BACK, 2-BACK) are alternated in a fixed order with each 30 s block. A
total of 12 blocks are presented in the study, with 20 trials (involving
presentation of 20 distracter stimuli and 20 letter targets) in each block.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094417.g001
Figure 2. Schematic diagram of the backward masking
procedure. This figure illustrates the order and timing of presentation
of distracters and targets, using the example of a food stimulus
(presented for 23 ms so as to not be consciously perceived),
immediately followed by a target letter (in this example, ‘D’) on a
mosaic background for 1077 ms, followed by a blank fixation circle on a
white background for 400 ms.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094417.g002
Masked Emotional Stimuli and Cognitive Load
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a diversity of content and minimise overlap between categories,
with attention paid to clarity and recognisability. We also sought to
minimise the cultural dependence of the content and meaning of
stimuli. Stimuli were selected from 56 colour photographs that
were preselected from the International Affective Picture System
(IAPS; [45]) and 126 images of items presented on a white plate on
a blue background from a database created by the authors (stimuli
available upon request). In the second step, five volunteers rated all
preselected photographs for pleasantness, aversion, salience, visual
complexity and recognisability using a computerised Visual
Analogue Scale (1–100). Based on these ratings, 20 from each
category were selected according to the following equally weighted
criteria: 1) recognisability (unambiguous content, easy to recog-
nise); 2) maximum aversion (aversive stimuli); maximum pleasant-
ness (appetitive stimuli); 3) categories matched for complexity and
colour.
Appetitive stimuli
Colour photographs of palatable sweet (e.g. chocolate) and
savoury (e.g. pasta) foods were selected from the IAPS; additional
photographs were created by the authors and matched to neutral
pictures for colour and visual complexity. Average ratings
(max= 100) were: salience 61 (SD 13), pleasantness 71 (SD 10),
aversion 19 (SD 11), complexity 34 (SD 17), recognisability 82 (SD
13).
Aversive stimuli
The IAPS photographs included scenes that elicit withdrawal-
motivated emotional states (e.g., violence). Average ratings were:
salience 75 (SD 17), pleasantness 30 (SD 9), aversion 68 (SD 8),
complexity 48 (SD 23), recognisability 73 (SD 15).
Neutral stimuli
Colour photographs of neutral inanimate objects (e.g., house-
hold objects) were created by the authors. Average ratings were:
salience 43 (SD 23), pleasantness 56 (SD 9), aversion 24 (SD 9),
complexity 35 (SD 17), recognisability 85 (SD 11).
Mosaic background images
A high contrast coloured mosaic was used as the backward
mask. The mosaic was created by the authors using unrecogni-
sable sections of the distracter stimuli as tiles. This procedure was
followed to ensure that the mask and subliminal stimuli shared
features (e.g., colour) in order to minimise the threshold at which
stimuli became subliminal [46]. Target and non-target letters were
presented in the centre of the mosaic (figure 2).
The N-back task
This task assesses working memory, attention and visuospatial
awareness [47]. Demand on working memory can be modified
using a different number (n) (1 or 2). To examine the relationship
between emotional interference and task load, alternating blocks of
1-back (low working memory load) and 2-back (high working
memory load) were used. Participants were presented with a
sequence of upper and lower case letters presented in a bold, red
colour and asked to respond if the same letter (independent of case)
was shown as the one preceding it by ‘n’ positions. Responses were
recorded between 100–1500 ms after onset of letter (target)
presentation. Blocks of 1-back and 2-back task (20 trials per block)
were separated by 4-sec intervals when the inscription ‘1-BACK’
or ‘2-BACK’ was presented on the screen. There were six blocks of
the 1-back and six blocks of the 2-back task and in both, 20% of
letters were targets. Cross-targets were eliminated, so that there
were no 1-back targets in the 2-back task and vice versa. For each
task, a short training sequence (20 trials) was used to ensure
participants understood instructions. Task difficulty (load) and
target letter sequences were counterbalanced between participants
(12 permutations of stimulus category and task difficulty were
used).
Forced choice task
After completion of all tasks, participants were asked if they had
seen any meaningful images during the tasks. If ‘‘yes’’, they were
asked to provide a written description of what they had seen. In a
second step, participants were told about the masked images and
shown all stimuli paired with novel stimuli matched for content
category. They were asked to choose a picture that they might
have seen and guess when uncertain. Both pictures (1268 cm)
were presented adjacent to each other on the screen (position was
counterbalanced between stimuli and novel pictures) until the
participant responded. Although this task is thought to indicate
awareness of stimuli (e.g., [44]), a definite indication of awareness
cannot be ascertained due to potential issues related to memory
consolidation.
Statistical Analysis
The dependent variables were the proportion of incorrect
responses (error rate) and average time to correct response
(response time) at each level of task load. Two separate 362
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) were performed
to explore the effects of distracter type (aversive, appetitive,
neutral) and task load (1-back, 2-back) on accuracy and on
response time in the n-back task.
Results
Forced choice performance
Awareness of distracter stimuli. Eleven participants re-
ported seeing images during the tasks. In five, descriptions did not
match any of the distracter stimuli, and the ‘seen’ images were
patterns in the mosaic mask (e.g., crowds, pebbles). These
participants typically reported seeing the same image all the time
and these were not identified in the forced choice. Three correctly
described one image and three described several images: they (4
females, 2 males) were considered ‘aware’ and excluded from
analyses. The remaining 25 participants (14 females) performed at
chance level in the objective forced choice measure, identifying on
average 29.96/60 (SD 4.5) of the stimuli and 30.04/60 (SD 4.5) of
novel comparison pictures as seen during the tasks, and were thus
included in further analyses.
N-back task
Effects of masked distracters on accuracy. Results from
the n-back task were analysed using a 362 repeated measures
ANOVA, comparing the within-subjects factors of task load (1-
back, 2-back) and distracter type (neutral, appetitive, aversive) on
mean error rate. As the Mauchly’s test of sphericity was non-
significant for the main effect of condition (x2(2) = 1.911,
p = 0.385), and the load*distracter type interaction (x2(2) = 1.795,
p = 0.408), compound sphericity can be assumed in this analysis.
This analysis identified a main effect of load, F(1,30) = 32.068,
p,0.001, which appeared to be driven by a higher mean error rate
(ME) in the 2-back task for all three distracter types (aversive:
ME=2.42, SD=2.391; appetitive: ME=2.39, SD=2.789; neu-
tral: ME=2.71, SD=2.069), compared to the 1-back task
(aversive: ME=1.55, SD=1.895; appetitive: ME=1.26,
SD=1.807; neutral: ME=0.55, SD=1.060). The mean error
Masked Emotional Stimuli and Cognitive Load
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rates and associated standard deviations and effect sizes are
displayed in table 1. The main effect of distracter type was not
significant in this analysis, F(3,60) = 1.029, p=0.364. A significant
interaction between load and distracter type was observed,
F(2,60) = 3.528, p=0.036.
Post-hoc paired-samples t-tests using Bonferroni correction
indicated that this interaction was driven by significantly more
errors in response to aversive compared to neutral masked stimuli,
t(30) = 3.288, p=0.015, and a trend for greater errors in response
to appetitive stimuli compared to neutral stimuli, t(30) = 2.580,
p=0.09, in the 1-back task. No significant differences in accuracy
were observed to result from appetitive compared to aversive
stimuli in the one-back task, t(30) = 0.769, p.0.05. Distracters did
not appear to affect accuracy in the 2-back task: post-hoc paired
samples t-tests did not reveal any significant differences in error
between distracter types: aversive vs. neutral, t(30) = -0.884,
appetitive vs. neutral, t(30) =20.701, aversive vs. appetitive,
t(30) = 0.088, all p.0.05.
Effects of masked distracters on response time. Mean
response times of correct responses were analysed by a 362
repeated measures ANOVA with the within subject factors of task
load (1-back, 2-back) and distracter type (neutral, appetitive,
aversive). Sphericity is assumed based on non-significant results on
Mauchly’s test for distracter type (x2(2) = 0.075, p = 0.963), and the
load*distracter type interaction (x2(2) = 0.011, p= 0.994). This
analysis revealed a significant main effect of load, F(1,30) = 23.437,
p,0.001, but not distracter type, F(2,60) = 1.514, p=0.228. The
main effect of load was driven by longer mean response times in
the 2-back task to all distracter types (aversive: mean
RT=560.37 ms, SD=98 ms; appetitive: mean RT=542.12 ms,
SD=93.90 ms; neutral: mean RT=539.46 ms, SD=117.13 ms)
compared to the 1-back task (aversive: mean RT=496.06 ms,
SD=93,89 ms; appetitive: mean RT=494.83 ms,
SD=72.77 ms; neutral: mean RT=483.10 ms, SD=57.19 ms).
The mean response times and associated standard deviations and
effect sizes are displayed in table 1. No significant interaction was
observed between task load and distracter type, F(2, 60) = 0.386,
p=0.681.
Correlations between interference coefficients
This study tested the hypothesis that the degree of interference
elicited by aversive and appetitive stimuli would be similar as both
stimulus categories have high motivational value. This was
explored by computing a coefficient of interference from aversive
and appetitive stimuli for each level of task load (e.g., [errors in
aversive – errors in neutral]/[errors in aversive + errors in
neutral]). Coefficients were calculated for the interference from the
appetitive stimuli in the same way. The aversive and appetitive
interference coefficients were strongly correlated at each level of
load after Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (1-back:
r=0.705, p=0.001; 2-back: r=0.582, p=0.001), but no correla-
tions were found between coefficients of different tasks (e.g.,
between a 1-back coefficient and a 2-back coefficient), p.0.05.
Discussion
This study explored the impact of task load on interference
caused by subliminally presented emotional stimuli. Specifically, it
examined whether the load-dependent interference effect observed
for supraliminal stimuli occurred when stimuli were not con-
sciously perceived. Our data are consistent with this proposal.
Participants made significantly more errors when exposed to
masked negative (compared to neutral) images and a trend for
more errors after exposure to masked positive (compared to
neutral) images in the low load (1-back) condition, but not the high
load (2-back) condition. While response times were longer for the
high load compared to the low load condition, there was no effect
of masked distracter type on response time in either load
condition. Thus, masked emotional stimuli impaired accuracy of
performance, and this was attenuated by increasing load. This
supports our hypotheses that emotional stimuli interfere with
performance in the absence of awareness, and that this subliminal
interference effect is influenced by task load. The interference
observed is unlikely to be due to non-specific distraction as the
emotional stimuli were compared with visually similar neutral
stimuli. Moreover, strong correlations were found between
appetitive and aversive interference coefficients within, but not
between, each load condition, supporting our hypothesis that the
extent of interference would be similar across emotional stimulus
(distracter) categories of high motivational value (appetitive and
aversive). Our findings hold several implications. Firstly, the
demonstration of interference supports the notion that top-down
goal-directed influences and bottom-up sensory/perceptual pro-
cesses compete for attentional resources. Secondly, interference
does not appear to be simply due to conscious evaluation of one’s
cognitive activity. Thirdly, it indicates that top-down cognitive
influences regulate attention in the absence of awareness, i.e., a
regulatory mechanism exists that is not dependent on metacogni-
tion.
Our findings support the existence of competition between top-
down cognitive and bottom-up sensory influences, proposed by
numerous models of selective attention [5–9]. Although emotional
stimuli did not affect response time in our study, we observed load-
dependent interference on performance accuracy. The reason for
Table 1. Accuracy and response times in the go/no-go and n-back tasks.
Task Type of masked distracter Mean Error ± SD Effect sizea Response time (ms) ± SD Effect sizea
1-BACK Aversive 1.5561.895 0.66** 496.06690.888 0.17
Food 1.2661.807 0.49* 494.83672.769 0.18
Neutral 0.5561.060 483.10657.187
2-BACK Aversive 2.4262.391 0.13 560.37697.999 0.2
Food 2.3962.789 0.13 543.12693.903 0.03
Neutral 2.7162.069 539.466117.135
aEffect size relative to neutral, given as Cohen’s d.
*Trend towards a difference from neutral condition after Bonferroni correction (p,0.1).
**Significant differences from the neutral condition after Bonferroni correction (p,0.01).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0094417.t001
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the lack of an observed effect of emotion on response time is not
clear, but in fact such differences between the two measures have
been observed in other studies. While some studies have observed
an effect on response time [15,19,40], our findings are consistent
with Mitchell et al., [14] who reported that more errors were made
in the presence of face stimuli expressing a negative emotion
compared to a neutral expression, but that emotional expression
had no effect on response time. The observation that load-
dependent interference effects occur in response to masked
emotional stimuli indicates that selective attention is biased
towards salient motivational stimuli, which is regulated by top-
down influences even in the absence of explicit awareness. These
results complement reports demonstrating that cognitive load
reduces interference from supraliminal emotional distracters (e.g.,
[3,23]). For example, Van Dillen & Derks [23] reported that high
cognitive load eliminated the impaired response time caused by
goal-irrelevant emotional distraction. Our data thus extend
previous findings by demonstrating that competition between
top-down goal-directed influences and salient motivational stimuli
occur without awareness and impact behaviour. Moreover, it
shows that the interference effect of masked stimuli is load-
dependent, suggesting that interactions between cognitive load
and emotion do not require metacognitions or awareness of the
emotional stimuli. This also argues against the notion that the
load-dependent interference effect is specific to perceptual but not
cognitive load [27].
Our findings are also in accord with neuroimaging studies
exploring emotional processing during cognitive task performance
(for rev., see [48]). For example, emotional arousal reduces activity
in cortical regions involved in higher level cognition, e.g.,
prefrontal cortex, and increases activity in emotion processing
centres, e.g., amygdala, under low but not high cognitive load
[49,50], suggesting there is a threshold at which behaviour is not
influenced by low level stimuli. Moreover, some research groups
have even reported that task load down-regulated neural activity
at emotional processing sites in response to emotional stimuli
[10,14,24–26] and reduced negative emotions subjectively report-
ed in response to negative stimuli [24]. Future studies may
investigate the neural correlates underlying the load*distracter
type interaction on accuracy (seen in the present study) to
determine whether they are similar to the interference effect seen
in studies involving supraliminal stimuli.
The ability to respond rapidly to motivational cues, e.g., those
related to threat, food or sex, is essential for survival of a species.
Most studies investigating interactions between cognition and
emotion have used aversive stimuli, e.g., negative facial expres-
sions or threat-related words/images. Some studies have included
a positive stimulus category, often comprised of happy faces, non-
threatening animals and evocative words/images, but these are
often largely heterogeneous and do not have the same motiva-
tional value as the stimuli in the aversive categories. As
motivational drives may influence cognition, we sought to establish
whether interference effects were consistent across different
stimulus categories of high motivational value [9]. Food is a
primary reward, is primarily appetitive and generates an
approach-motivated emotional state [51]. Food stimuli have been
used in a positive valence category (e.g., [19]) and are reportedly
more efficient than other positive emotional stimuli at inhibiting
acoustic startle responses [52]. Attentional bias towards food has
been demonstrated in non-patient populations who are hungry or
fasted [53,54], or are sensitive to external food cues [55], however
has mainly been studied in the context of disordered eating (for
rev., see [56]). In the present study, interference resulted from
exposure to both appetitive and aversive stimuli, suggesting the
load-dependent interference effect is not valence specific. More-
over, strong correlations between the appetitive and aversive
interference coefficients suggest that the degree of interference is
similar across distracter categories. These correlations were only
strong within each level of task load, but not between load
conditions, i.e., the appetitive and aversive coefficients for the 1-
back task correlated with each other, but not with the coefficients
calculated for the 2-back task. Our results are consistent with
studies showing that emotional stimuli, regardless of valence,
influence cognitive processing [12,16,57,58], although there is also
evidence for differential effects of valence on performance [59].
However, post-hoc t-tests for the 1-back task indicated that after
correction for multiple comparisons, exposure to aversive images
elicited significantly more errors compared to neutral distracters,
whereas a trend for greater errors after viewing masked positive
compared to neutral images was observed. This suggests that while
both categories appear to interfere with cognitive performance at
low load, and this interference effect is strongly correlated between
motivational stimulus categories, the effect is stronger for aversive
stimuli.
In addition to task load and stimulus salience, other factors may
affect interactions between top-down cognitive and bottom-up
sensory processing, e.g., the emotional intensity of salient, task-
irrelevant stimuli [60], or individual differences in task motivation
and stimulus relevance [11]. One study manipulated the emotional
intensity of task-irrelevant stimuli and reported that the attenua-
tion of interference under high cognitive load only occurred when
the emotional intensity of the distracting stimuli was high [60].
This is consistent with our data that irrelevant emotional, but not
neutral stimuli cause interference at low, but not high cognitive
load. However, as emotional intensity was not directly manipu-
lated in this study, it would be interesting to investigate the
influence of such additional factors on the load-dependent
interference effects using subliminal and supraliminal task-
irrelevant stimuli.
This study has some limitations. It is difficult to be certain that
masked images were not seen. However, we used an established
procedure for masking pictorial stimuli and at the end of the
experiment, we ran subjective and objective assessments to ensure
images were not consciously perceived. Nonetheless, some masked
images may have been seen despite chance performance on the
forced choice task. To address this, we combined the forced choice
test with some subjective written questions about whether
participants had seen any images during the study. Use of positive
stimuli might be problematic, given that individual differences in
attractiveness ratings are reported to be greater than in aversion
ratings [61]. However, we used images of food, which reliably
elicit appetitive arousal and can be considered primary emotional
stimuli [51]. Although there are individual differences in food
preferences, we chose images with consistently positive ratings.
In conclusion, masked emotional (appetitive and aversive), but
not neutral, stimuli interfered with performance on a cognitive task
at low (1-back), but not high (2-back) load. This is in agreement
with reports that supraliminal emotional stimuli exert load-
dependent interference effects on performance. Our study extends
these findings by demonstrating that this load-dependent interfer-
ence effect applies to masked emotional stimuli and generalises
across stimulus categories with high motivational value. Our data
support models of selective attention that propose cognition and
emotion compete for attentional resources. Interference from
masked emotional stimuli at low load supports the notion that
attention is biased towards salient stimuli, while the dissipation of
interference under high load indicates the involvement of top-
down regulation of attention. As stimuli were not consciously
Masked Emotional Stimuli and Cognitive Load
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perceived, our data also suggest that such top-down goal-directed
regulation of attention may occur in the absence of explicit
awareness and hence does not require metacognitive monitoring
or evaluation of bias over behaviour. Thus, some degree of self-
regulation occurs at a sub-conscious level. Future neuroimaging
studies will be required to further delineate the neural mechanisms
underlying this effect, and to evaluate the similarity with the neural
activity changes reported in response to supraliminal distracters.
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